PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED IN THE CANADIAN FIREARMS PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION
(to
September 2002 Technical Report) – April 2003
NOTE:
This 58-page CFC Evaluation was obtained by Garry Breitkreuz, MP from the
Department of Justice under the authority of the Access to Information Act -
Justice Dept. ATIP File: A-2003-0121 dated September 9, 2003.
PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED IN THE
“EXECUTIVE SUMMARY”
Page i:
“The evaluation does not examine any of the outcomes/impacts of the
legislation with respect to preventing the criminal misuse of firearms or
preventing firearm accidents and suicides.
Page iii:
“Issues that posed challenges to the Program’s implementation included:
opposition to firearm control; opting-out by several jurisdictions; overall
Program complexity; delays in developing the Firearms Act regulations; technical
challenges with the Canadian Firearms Registration System; lack of operational
program experience at the Department of Justice Canada; and, public confusion
and high rates of user error on the initial licence and firearm registration
application forms.”
Page iv:
“The ‘split path’ management structure in place at the outset of the
Program was one of the factors that delayed the efficient and effective
implementation of the CFP. In
addition to the ‘split path’ structure, the ‘consensus approach’ to
program management hampered direct action on, and often aggravated Program
implementation challenges.”
Page iv:
“Despite extensive communications efforts, a substantial number of firearms
owners do not fully understand their responsibilities under the Firearms Act.”
Page iv:
“Moreover, many firearm owners are now in violation of the law (by September
2002, over 200,000 owners had not complied with the legislation by obtaining a
licence.”
Page v:
“As the Program prepares for ‘steady state’ mode, there are conflicting
views about the role of the opt-in provinces in the Program as it pertains to
Program policy and over all Program development.”
Page v:
“The Program is not being implemented and applied uniformly across the
country.”
Page v:
“However, the credibility of the Program is somewhat threatened by the
perception that certain elements are being non-uniformly interpreted and
enforced.”
Page v:
“Examples, of inconsistent Program delivery are: some jurisdictions show less
discretion in enforcing the legislation than others; replica guns are treated
differently; the interpretation of the regulations varies; different procedures
are followed at the two main processing sites; and, there are diverse delivery
models and different costs for the Canadian Firearm Safety courses.”
Page vi:
“In addition, not all jurisdictions are electronically connected to provincial
court databases, meaning the prohibition orders are not automatically captured
and entered into the system.”
Page vi:
“Moreover, ‘continuous eligibility’ partially relies on the Firearms
Interest Police database being accurate and up to date, and often this is not
the case.”
Page vi:
“Unverified non-restricted firearm registration identification data may not be
forensically correct and as such, there is a possibility that in certain
circumstances, the registration data might not be able to conclusively identify
the ownership of a non-restricted firearm.”
Page vi:
“Licence application forms were initially too long and complex (e.g. eight
pages) and this discouraged compliance and resulted in high rates of user
error.”
Page vi:
“The Quebec processing site (and the Ottawa site – when operational) is less
efficient and more prone to error than the Central Processing Site.”
Page vii:
“The Verifiers Network was initially a robust initiative, but it appears to
have lost momentum over time. Although,
there are approximately five thousand volunteers who are approved verifiers, the
current status of the Network is open to question.
Page vii:
“That being said, a substantial number of firearm owners have not yet complied
with the licensing requirement, and there still is a degree of confusion amongst
firearm owners between licensing and registration.”
Page vii:
“For some firearms owners, the fear of confiscation is one of the factors
associated with non-compliance with the requirements of the Firearms Act.
Firm commitments that firearm confiscation is not the intent of the
legislation, that fees will not become an obstacle to lawful firearms ownership,
and that the rights of legitimate firearm owners will be respected would
probably help mitigate the fears of some firearm owners.”
Page viii:
“As a result, certain Aboriginal adaptation regulations receive limited use by
some Chief Firearm Officers.”
Page viii: “Two to three years ago, cuts to research funding and personnel reduced the Centre’s research capacity and its ability to support policy development and decision making processes. Objective and thorough research should play a key role in the evolution and future of the Program; however, unless research resource levels are significantly augmented, this is highly unlikely.”
PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED IN CHAPTER 3
– “FINDINGS”
Page 22: “At
least in hindsight, the initial implementation time lines and ambiguous net
estimate of $85 million to implement the CFRS were quite unrealistic and damaged
the credibility of the program.”
Page 27:
“Key informants, including CFC personnel, offered the nearly unanimous view
that the CFCs structure in the early years of the CFP was poorly designed.
Interviewees indicated that at the outset of the Program in 1995, concern
over the failure of some large information technology (IT) projects led to the
creation of a ‘split path’ management structure with separate policy and
operations branches reporting to an Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) acting as a
part-time manager. The CFC and the
CFP was only one of the many duties of the manager; therefore, full-time
management and oversight of the Program was simply not possible.”
Page 27:
“Without strong central leadership and coordination, there was a tendency by
the CFC to allow processes and costs to escalate in order to meet the interests
of the different parties involved in the Program. Given the diverse interests involved in the CFP, this
situation significantly contributed to the delays and cost overruns.”
Page 27:
“Adding to the challenges presented by the ‘split path’ management
structure was a ‘consensus approach’ to program management. The ‘consensus approach’ let to the accommodation of a
large number of often diverging views/opinions and interests into the early
design and decision making processes of the CFP.
This in turn resulted in: a) overly complex regulations; and an equally
large and complex IT system (i.e. the CFRS).
The search for consensus had a cascading effect on the entire
implementation of the CFP.”
Page 28:
“Perhaps the earliest and most obvious challenge to the CFP was the very vocal
and relatively organized opposition to the legislation among many firearm
owners. This opposition cause the
CFC to spend a great deal of time addressing the critics of, and disinformation
pertaining to, the Program. Overcoming
this opposition and the challenges associated with it was not only an
operational challenge, but led to increased implementation costs as well.”
Page 28:
“Several of the provinces chose to opt-out of administering the Firearms Act.
This increased the Program delivery costs and there is a belief that it
may have hurt the perceived credibility of the Program.”
Page 28:
“In effect, a very complex piece of legislation led to equally complex
regulations, which in turn led to an overbuilt/overcomplicated data management
system and ultimately resulted in a very complex Program to deliver.”
Page 29:
“The length of time taken to develop the regulations created unforeseen time
pressures to implement other aspects of the CFP. This resulted in a need for numerous revisions and
workarounds.
Page 29:
“Finally (and perhaps most importantly), the fact that regulations had to be
reviewed by Standing Committees led to significant delays in completing them.”
Page 29: “Many of the key informants mentioned the technical challenges and problems with the CFRS as a serious obstacle to the implementation of the CFP. The rushed development process, as noted in Section 3.1.4.5 (Delays in the Firearms Act regulations), was believed to be a major contributor to these problems. Users of the CFRS commonly identified long wait times for processing and even complete system failures early into the development of the CFRS.”
Page 29:
“A number of interviewees observed that the various work groups at the CFC
often operated in isolation, resulting in challenges to coordination of effort
in the implementation process. There
is a belief that for a relatively new program, there was a high degree of
‘stove-piping’/compartmentalization and as a result, the CFC was not working
as an effective unit.”
Page 30:
“The complexity of the Program, combined with numerous changes to Program
implementation deadlines, fees, etc., contributed to confusion among some
firearms owners and the general public.”
Page 30: “One
of the most critical parts of the CFP was the relationship between the federal
and provincial governments. While
the Program involves federal legislation, regulations, and components, the
provinces are responsible for certain elements of the CFP.
The normal strains of this shared responsibility were exacerbated in the
case of the CFP because the views of the provincial partners towards the Program
ranged from enthusiastic support to overt hostility.”
Page 31:
“These strains between the federal and opt-in provincial officials have been
exacerbated by financial issues, as several of the CFOs feel that the Federal
Government is moving too quickly toward ‘steady state’ funding, and others
are concerned that they do not receive sufficient warning of new funding levels
to be able to make necessary adjustments in staff.”
Page 32:
“The other issue to be considered in this section relates to the fact that
ATTs and ATCs are issued on a provincial basis (as set out in the legislation).
In certain circumstances, this can make crossing provincial boundaries
problematic. Examples cited
included traveling across the country for a gun show or shooting competition,
and armoured car employees who travel amongst several provinces and who may have
the occasion to work from different sites.
Due to the fact that the provinces are responsible for ATTs and ATCs, an
additional administrative burden can be created for individuals and companies
that travel across Canadian provincial boarders [sic], and at times, the ATT and
ATC regulations can be interpreted differently in one provincial jurisdiction
versus another.”
Page 33:
“This section examines the overall implementation of the CFRS.
Key informants noted that it is very complicated to utilize, it cost far
more than predicted, and it still does not have optimal functionality.”
Page 33/34:
“It should be noted that the system can be rather slow at times, particularly
during peak periods. Firearm
officers in the field (i.e. without access to main servers and high-speed lines)
are often unable to gain access to the system and must call their regional
office to get access to CFRS data/information.”
Page 34:
“First, it was reported that ATT and ATC information is not contained in the
CFRS, but is contained externally in a separate off-line software application.
This has the potential to raise/introduce logistical and operational
problems. For example, if police stop someone who is transporting a
restricted firearm to a gun club, the police are unable to verify the ATT via
the CFRO and as a result, they may have to call the CFO.”
Page 34:
“Additionally, not all jurisdictions are electronically connected to
provincial court databases, meaning that prohibition orders are not
automatically captured and entered into the CFRS.
In many provinces, courts send hard copies of orders to the office of the
CFO and then they are subsequently entered manually into the CFRS.”
Page 34:
“Police users observed that when making a query on the way to a residential
call, the system only generates a list of firearm registration certificate
numbers. As a result, each
individual registration certificate number has to be queried in order to know
what specific kinds of firearms are in a residence.
Police officers are interested in knowing what types of firearms may be
located in a residence, and sufficient time to query specific firearm-type
information is not always available.”
Page 35:
“The Firearms Interest Police (FIP) Database – In essence, continuous
eligibility is a major component of the CFP and, likewise, FIP is a major
component of continuous eligibility. There
would appear to be several issues that threaten the effectiveness of FIP.
First, policing agencies do not follow consistent procedures for entering
FIP data. Some agencies were reported to be entering data for incidents
that were seen as being irrelevant to firearms ownership.
Second, anytime a FIP file is modified in any way by the operating police
agency, it generates another or duplicate FIP hit or flag, which may have to be
investigated by the CFO. The net
result could be dozens of hits or flags for one individual, which in turn may
place a great burden on the CFO office personnel.
The main concern expressed over this issue is that relevant risk data
could be overlooked among large amounts of irrelevant/duplicate data.
Third, personal identifying information that is contained in FIP is often
inexact (for example, surname and first initial only) and therefore could apply
to a number of individuals. This
necessitates detailed follow-up on other police databases, and the CFOs reported
some difficulties gaining access to this information.
Page 35:
“Related to the FIP issue, is a reported barrier to gaining access to some
police information required to investigate FIP hits. For example, in RCMP jurisdictions, CFOs reported that in
order to determine whether an incident warrants further action with respect to a
firearms licence, they require access to certain screens of the RCMP Police
Information Retrieval System (i.e. The RCMP’s electronic file management)
database.”
Page 35/36:
“In response to issues raised by the Privacy Commissioner, the RCMP in some
jurisdictions is not allowing CFOs to view police information directly.
The current practice in some RCMP jurisdictions involves the CFO making a
written request to an RCMP detachment and subsequently the necessary information
is retrieved, vetted and then provided to the CFO.
This is a cumbersome and time-consuming process since RCMP Detachments
often do not have designated personnel to perform this task.
As a result, there are
instances where the CFO does not receive the requested information at all.
This lack of direct access to police information (as it pertains to
Section 5 of the Firearms Act) may jeopardize the value of the FIP and
negatively affect secondary and/or tertiary licence investigations.”
Page 37:
“As a result, until the registered individually owned non-restricted firearms
change ownership post-January 1, 2003, registration information on these
firearms remains unverified and as such, the accuracy of the registration data
is open to question.”
Page 37:
“The consensus among several key informants is that unverified non-restricted
firearm registration identification may not be accurate, and as such, there is a
possibility that in certain circumstances, the registration data might not be
able to conclusively identify the ownership of a non-restricted firearm.
Page 38:
“Licence application forms were initially too long and complex (e.g. eight
pages) and this discouraged compliance and resulted in high rates of user
error.”
Page 38:
“There is general agreement among informants that fees for licensing, firearm
registration, and firearm transfers were an impediment to legislative compliance
for many firearm owners.”
Page 38:
“This fear [of confiscation] as a major obstacle to compliance with both the
licensing and the firearm registration provisions of the CFP.
A number of CFC interviewees indicated they were aware of this concern
among a substantial number of firearm owners.”
Page 39:
“Another related concern among some firearm owners was that fees could be used
in the future to affect an inflationary prohibition. This is, some owners fear that fees will rise to the point
that some individuals will no longer be able to afford to own firearm.”
Page 39:
“There were a number of problems that were experienced by the two processing
sites (the CPS and the Quebec site) early into the implementation of the CFP.
Most of these are well known as a result of the media attention that they
received. Specific examples included: licences being sent to the wrong
person, licences with incorrect information, and licences with the incorrect
photographs.”
Page 39:
“Additionally, the contract arrangement with HRDC led to difficulties in
making CPS staff directly accountable, and there were some strains between CPS
management and the HRDC employees.”
Page 39/40:
“It was reported that the time required for firearm transfer requests to be
processed by the CPS can be excessive. Telephone
wait times to get through to CPS personnel were often reported to be 20 minutes
or more, and subsequent wait times for approval of the transfer (particularly
restricted firearms) have sometimes taken days or even weeks.”
Page 40:
“Businesses whose employees are armed, largely armoured car companies, face
particular problems as a result of licensing processing delays.
Some reported experiencing a two-month waiting period for newly hired
employees to obtain a licence since few applicants already hold a PAL for
restricted firearms. Even those
applicants who are previously licenced must typically wait two to four weeks for
an ATC application to be processed.”
Page 40:
“An ongoing problem is the fact that there are two processing sites (a third,
located in Ottawa when the volume of work demands it) and they do not have
standardized operations. There is a
belief that the Quebec site and the temporary processing site in Ottawa could
benefit from the experience of the CPS (in turn improving their efficiency), but
this knowledge and experience is essentially being ignored.”
Page 41:
“Although the Verifiers Network was initially a robust initiative, the
consensus among key informants was that Network related activity was diminished
over time and that its current status is questionable.
Page 41:
“On a related subject to the Verifiers Network, the FRT [Firearms Reference
Table] is believed to be a useful tool, though not necessarily complete.
Some key informants noted that it may never be complete, given the nearly
infinite number of combinations and permutations of firearms.
Other users indicated that it is rather complex as a result of attempting
to make it forensically correct.”
Page 42:
“Key informants noted that many processing problems resulted from manual data
entry errors.”
Page 42:
“A significant initial amount of non-compliance with the licensing legislative
deadline was the result of confused firearm owners.”
Page 43:
“However, as the Program shifts from implementation to ‘steady state’
operations, some of the provincial partners now believe that inter-governmental
communications have deteriorated.”
Page 43:
“There is an overall belief that this enforcement approach created a degree of
resentment among some firearm owners and may have contributed to some degree of
non-compliance with the CFP.”
Page 43:
“It would appear that some of the best sources of information regarding
Firearms Act-related court decisions and Program implementation developments are
web sites maintained by opponents of the firearms legislation.”
Page 43:
“It should be noted however, that despite all of the CFC’s communications
efforts, many owners still do not fully understand their responsibilities under
the Firearms Act. The main point of
confusion centers on the difference between licensing and firearm
registration.”
Page 44:
“Overall, interviewees believe that the CFC could have more effectively
countered inaccurate and unsubstantiated statements about the Program.”
Page 44:
“Of the key informants from policing agencies, very few reported that they had
received CFC legislative training materials.
Rather, policing agencies reported developing their own training
materials for the Firearms Act.”
Page 44:
“While most police interviewees believe that their officers know what is
required to enforce the Act, some noted that the complexity of the legislation
might pose challenges.”
Page 45:
“The lack of ongoing legislative training for CFO office personnel was
identified as the only area of concern.”
Page 45:
“Interviews with key informants who have knowledge of the various facets of
the criminal justice system indicate that overall, few court officials have
received legislative training materials. A
limited number of prosecutors have asked for presentations on the legislation,
but the requests are not widespread. The exception appears to be in Ontario, where there are
dedicated Crowns who have been trained in the legislation.”
Page 46:
“While the safety courses themselves are viewed positively, key informants
express concern over the lack of consistency in the delivery models across
Canada.”
Page 46:
“Aboriginal respondents had no serious objections to the regulations
themselves, but they noted that the exceptions contained within the regulations
need to be applied very carefully and should therefore consider the input from
the community. The most common
concern expressed was related to the number and complexity of the forms required
for Aboriginal people to have the regulations apply.”
Page 47:
“Aboriginal key informants were satisfied with much of the Program but had two
major concerns that relate to the current debate over treaty rights and the
status of First nations communities. First,
a number of Aboriginal leaders claim that hunting is a traditional lifestyle and
cultural issue for Aboriginal people., and is a right that is guaranteed by
treaty. Second, many are not
pleased with the definition and interpretation of sustenance hunting and
basically feel that all Aboriginal people should be considered sustenance
hunters (and as a result, should not be charged fees associated with licensing
and/or firearm registration.”
Page 47:
“Cuts to research commencing in 1999 and subsequent cuts may have negatively
affected the implementation of the Program by limited insight into key policy
issues.
Page 47:
“At the time this evaluation was conducted, policy and Program research had
been reduced to the point of being non-existent and as a result, there is a very
limited capacity to conduct research that can proactively feed into policy
development processes.”
PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED IN CHAPTER 4
– “CONCLUSIONS”
Page 50: “This
complex program has offered and will continue to offer a variety of challenges
to the CFC and the Program partners, and it is highly probable that even with
the adoption of the CEO model, challenges will continue to arise.”
Page 51: “Even
if the government estimate is extremely accurate, over 200,000 firearm owners
are in violation of the law.”
Page 51:
“There is a general lack of understanding of the Program’s full impact on
the workload of various firearms-related businesses. As well as coping with certain CFP-related administrative
requirements imposed on their own businesses, many businesses are dealing with
customer requests for information and assistance on complying with the
legislation and regulations.”
Page 52:
“From the inception of the Program, there have been tensions between the CFC
and the opt-in provincial personnel – particularly the CFOs.”
Page 52:
“The reduction in opt-in jurisdiction influence (in the area of CFP policy and
overall Program decisions/development) continues to be a point of contention
between the Program partners.”
Page 52:
“It will be a challenge to maintain clear federal control of all policy
aspects of the Program while also taking advantage of the operational experience
and infrastructure that has been developed within the opt-in jurisdictions.”
Page 52:
“The information flow from the CFC to the offices of the opt-in CFOs has been
reduced dramatically since the fall of 2000, coinciding with the introduction of
the new management structure and move towards ‘steady state’ operations.”
Page 53:
“CFOs are interpreting the regulations under the Firearms Act differently, and
as a result firearm owners are receiving somewhat non-uniform treatment.”
Page 53:
“However, the credibility of the CFP is somewhat threatened by the perception
that certain elements are being non-uniformly interpreted and enforced.”
Page 53:
“A key lesson is that in the absence of standards and uniform policies for
Program implementation and administration, it is difficult to deliver a federal
program fairly consistently across the country.
Page 53:
“While the CFRS is functioning adequately, it still requires improvement for
optimal performance.”
Page 54:
“ ‘Continuous eligibility’ partially relies on the FIP database being
accurate and up to date, and this is often not the case. A review of FIP policies and procedures (and communicating
correct procedures to the Canadian policing community) is essential to identify
and correct the current situation.”
Page 54:
“The consensus among several key informants is that unverified non-restricted
firearm registration identification data may not be forensically correct and as
such, there is a possibility that in certain circumstances, the registration
data might not be able to conclusively identify the ownership of a
non-restricted firearm.”
Page 54:
“The Quebec processing sit (and the Ottawa site – when operational) is less
efficient and more prone to error than the CPS.”
Page 54:
“Inordinate delays to process applications and highly publicized errors will
continue to attract negative publicity and could future [?] damage the
credibility of the Program with the general public.”
Page 55:
“The status of the Verifiers Network is not clear.”
Page 56: “Another issue is that the prohibited handgun and unregistered restricted firearm amnesty has not covered non-restricted firearms. A clear statement is required, that unlicenced individuals wishing to dispose of their firearms may do so without fear of legal repercussions (unless, of course, the firearm has been used in the commission of an offence).”
Page 56:
“One overall concern is that with Program staff turnover and potential changes
to the legislation and regulations, additional training materials will be
required. In addition, there may be
a need to proactively target members of the court system as part of a training
strategy.”
Page 57:
“In jurisdictions without set fees, and particularly in areas with little
competition among safety instructors, costs for safety courses can be
prohibitive. Widely varying fees
across Canada are most likely not appropriate for a course that is required to
satisfy criteria defined by federal legislation and forms part of a national
program.”
Page 57:
“For most CFOs, public safety supersedes the application of the Aboriginal
adaptation regulations and as a result, certain regulations receive limited use.
Many CFOs fail to see why they should expose an Aboriginal community to a
potential safety risk that would not be accepted in a non-Aboriginal community;
therefore, the utility of this specific regulation (and some others) come into
question.”
ABOVE ARE 90 PROBLEMS THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT EVALUATORS IDENTIFIED BY TALKING TO PEOPLE WHO SUPPORT
THE BILLION-DOLLAR GUN REGISTRY.
JUST THINK WHAT THE EVALUATORS WOULD HAVE DISCOVERED IF
THEY HAD TALKED TO SOME OF THE CITIZENS WHO WERE FORCED (UNDER THREAT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION) TO REGISTER THEMSELVES AND THEIR FIREARMS!
Page 9: “The key informant interviews were comprised of over 90 interviews, drawn from the following groups:
q CFC staff;
q CPS staff;
q Representatives of federal departments involved in the CFP (i.e. RCMP, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT);
q CFOs, Firearm Officers (FO), and staff of the office of the CFO from both opt-in and opt-out jurisdictions;
q Representatives involved in the criminal justice system;
q Representatives from policing agencies – including police instructors/trainers;
q Canadian Firearm Safety course Master instructors and instructors;
q Members of the Minister’s User Group.